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Inducing amnesia through systemic suppression
Justin C. Hulbert1, Richard N. Henson2 & Michael C. Anderson2,3
Hippocampal damage profoundly disrupts the ability to store new memories of life events.
Amnesic windows might also occur in healthy people due to disturbed hippocampal function
arising during mental processes that systemically reduce hippocampal activity. Intentionally
suppressing memory retrieval (retrieval stopping) reduces hippocampal activity via control
mechanisms mediated by the lateral prefrontal cortex. Here we show that when people
suppress retrieval given a reminder of an unwanted memory, they are considerably more
likely to forget unrelated experiences from periods surrounding suppression. This amnesic
shadow follows a dose-response function, becomes more pronounced after practice
suppressing retrieval, exhibits characteristics indicating disturbed hippocampal function, and
is predicted by reduced hippocampal activity. These ﬁndings indicate that stopping retrieval
engages a suppression mechanism that broadly compromises hippocampal processes and
that hippocampal stabilization processes can be interrupted strategically. Cognitively
triggered amnesia constitutes an unrecognized forgetting process that may account for
otherwise unexplained memory lapses following trauma.
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T
rying to forget the past may inadvertently cause amnesia
for the present. This surprising possibility follows from the
neural mechanisms underlying memory formation and
motivated forgetting. Decades of research on memory formation
show that the hippocampus is essential for constructing
new episodic memories. Hippocampal damage irreversibly harms
people’s ability to store new memories, causing profound amnesia
for life’s events1,2. Reversibly disturbing the hippocampus
through optogenetic, electrical and pharmacological inter-
ventions temporarily disrupts memory formation3,4. Research
on motivated forgetting, on the other hand, indicates that people
often downregulate hippocampal activity through cognitive
control when they are reminded of an unwelcome event and
try to stop retrieval5–11. Together, these ﬁndings imply a striking
possibility: if stopping (suppressing) episodic retrieval reduces
hippocampal activity, this may broadly disturb all hippocampal
functions, including—critically—processes necessary to form and
retain new, stable memories. Retrieval suppression may, in
essence, induce a transient ‘virtual lesion’, leaving in its wake, an
amnesic shadow for any experiences—whether related or not to
the memory being suppressed—that simply have the misfortune
of happening near in time to efforts to forget.
To test this hypothesis, we measured how well people
remembered experiences near in time to their efforts to retrieve
or suppress an unrelated memory. To induce retrieval and
suppression, we adapted the Think/No-Think (TNT) procedure
used to study how people control unwanted memories, yielding a
new hippocampal modulation paradigm (HM Paradigm, Fig. 1).
In the TNT procedure, people perform trials requiring them to
attend to a reminder of a past event; for each reminder, they are
cued to retrieve the associated memory (Think trials), or to
suppress its retrieval (No-Think trials). Suppressing retrieval in
response to a strong reminder reduces blood–oxygen-level
dependent activation in the hippocampus and impairs retention
of the suppressed memory5–11. These reductions originate from
inhibitory control processes supported by the dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex6–11. Retrieving memories, in contrast,
increases hippocampal activity12 and often facilitates later
recall13. Thus, hippocampal activity can be modulated
according to task goals, though practice at suppressing retrieval
is often necessary to achieve hippocampal reductions6. A key
assumption of the present work is that this modulation does not
target particular memories, which may be a person’s goal, but
rather reﬂects a broadly targeted suppression (hereinafter,
‘systemic suppression’) of regional activity in the hippocampus
that generally disrupts other memory functions supported by this
region. For instance, beyond simply disrupting episodic retrieval,
systemically suppressing hippocampal activity may also prevent
freshly encoded stimulus input from generating new hippocampal
traces (that is, hippocampal encoding) or, instead may disrupt
existing hippocampal encodings, preempting their transformation
into stable episodic memories (that is, stabilization processes).
To examine how suppression affected memories near in time,
we inserted novel ‘innocent bystander’ stimuli between Think or
No-Think trials (Fig. 1). Unbeknownst to participants, we
planned to test their memory for these items after the
hippocampal modulation task. We selected bystanders that were
unrelated to the memories people controlled during Think and
No-Think trials, allowing us to assess whether suppression
broadly affected memories near in time. For each bystander,
participants made a simple semantic encoding decision. Impor-
tantly, both before and after each bystander, we inserted ‘buffer’
intervals during which participants viewed a series of digits and
decided whether each was odd or even. The buffer intervals
inserted before bystander stimuli ensured that the same task
always preceded bystanders, holding the distraction caused by
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Figure 1 | Hippocampal modulation (HM) paradigm and predictions. After studying word pairs (phase 1), participants perform trials requiring that they
either retrieve (green) or suppress (red) retrieval of the second word in each pair, given the ﬁrst word. Inserted between these trials are novel ‘bystander’
pictures that participants encode by silently answering the question, ‘Why is the pictured object in this location?’ Even/odd buffer judgments performed
before and after bystanders match the immediate task context across retrieve and suppress trials. The line graph illustrates the predicted efﬁcacy of
hippocampus-dependent memory processes (‘mnemonic processing efﬁciency’) during the above events. Of interest is whether surrounding bystanders
with suppression trials affects later memory for bystander pictures, causing an ‘amnesic shadow.’ This is assessed in phase 3, in which the participant must
recall the associated object for each context scene.
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switching between tasks constant across conditions (see Methods
section and Supplementary Information for further discussion);
buffer intervals following bystanders functioned to interrupt
participants’ lingering thoughts about the bystander, ensuring
that voluntary encoding processes ceased before the next
suppression or retrieval trial14. Because the buffer trials before
and after bystanders were present uniformly in all conditions, any
observed differences in later bystander recall across conditions
must arise from neighbouring suppression and retrieval trials and
not from the immediately surrounding buffer task.
Our amnesic shadow hypothesis predicts memory lapses for
experiences occurring near in time to retrieval suppression, when
suppression has impaired hippocampus-dependent functioning.
Suppression should therefore reduce episodic memory indices for
bystanders, such as contextual binding15 and recollection, which
depend on the hippocampus and are impaired in amnesia16. The
worst forgetting should arise when suppression abuts an event on
both sides (two suppression doses); an intermediate amount
when it abuts one side (one dose); and the best retention when it
abuts neither side (zero dose). We focused our initial analyses on
bystanders in the second half of the hippocampal modulation
session, after participants had practised suppressing—the same
period that suppression-related hippocampal activity has been
driven below pretrial baseline in prior work6. We found that
suppressing episodic retrieval of an unwanted memory induces an
amnesic shadow for experiences occurring near in time to efforts
to suppress, and that this forgetting is related to the controlled
reduction of hippocampal activity.
Results
A lasting reduction in episodic memory. In experiment one, the
to-be-controlled memories were word pairs and the bystanders
were novel photographs, each presenting a central object in a
background setting. The relation between the object and the
setting was not predictable (for example, a peacock in a parking
lot; Fig. 1). When each photograph appeared, participants
imagined how the object came to be in the setting and rated the
difﬁculty of constructing the explanation—a task that encouraged
episodic associations between the object and its setting.
After the hippocampal modulation phase, we displayed each
background and asked participants to remember what object had
appeared in it.
Participants’ memory suffered for bystander scenes presented
between suppression trials (Fig. 2a). Relative to bystanders dosed
with zero suppressions, object recall (for example, peacock) was
worse for scenes dosed with two epochs (F1,20¼ 7.63, P¼ 0.012).
Remarkably, object recall showed a 42% proportional reduction,
relative to the zero-dose condition. Experiment 2 replicated
this pattern (Fig. 2b; F1,20¼ 4.65, P¼ 0.043) with a 24-h
delay between suppression and test, revealing a similar 45%
proportional recall reduction (see Supplementary Fig. 1 and
Supplementary Table 1 for an overview of this and later
experiments).
It was necessary to consider whether memory lapses might
simply reﬂect differences in processing time on bystander items,
perhaps owing to differences in distraction following suppression
and retrieval trials. No evidence of differential processing was
found, however. On the semantic decision task (Supple-
mentary Fig. 2a), participants spent comparable time across the
three conditions in making their ratings (F2,38¼ 0.28, P¼ 0.757),
and the rating decisions themselves did not differ (F2,38¼ 1.05,
P¼ 0.358). Moreover, the intervening buffer task (Supplementary
Fig. 2b) should have been affected by such distraction, but
performance on it differed neither in speed nor accuracy
as a function of whether it was performed after a retrieval or
suppression trial (trials occurring before bystander presentation:
reaction time, F1,20¼ 0.11, P¼ 0.743; accuracy, F1,20¼ 0.05,
P¼ 0.829; trials occurring afterwards: reaction time, F1,20¼ 2.18,
P¼ 0.156; accuracy, F1,20¼ 1.69, P¼ 0.209). This conclusion
held even after aggregating reaction times from the hundreds
of participants across all studies in this article (representing
14,000–16,000 trials per condition; see Supplementary Table 2
and Supplementary Data for detailed analyses). The buffer task
data thus provide little support for the possibility that participants
were differentially distracted by the preceding suppression or
retrieval tasks during bystander presentation. The large memory
reduction observed in experiment 1 is thus consistent with the
hypothesized dose-dependent disruption of hippocampus-depen-
dent memory processes caused by the surrounding suppression
periods.
Speciﬁcity of deﬁcits to suppression. According to our
hypothesis, the amnesic shadow is tied to control processes that
systemically reduce hippocampal activity. Recent work indicates
that people can control retrieval of an unwanted memory in two
ways. On one hand, they can stop retrieval entirely (that is, ‘direct
suppression’), which reduces hippocampal activity; alternatively,
people can avoid retrieving a memory by recalling a ‘substitute
thought,’ which does not reduce hippocampal activity8. If so,
bystanders inserted between direct suppression trials should
exhibit a shadow, but those inserted between thought substitution
trials should not. Experiment 3 conﬁrmed this prediction
(0 versus 2 doses for the direct suppression group, F1,20¼ 4.91,
P¼ 0.038, 25% proportional reduction; for thought substitution,
F1,20¼ 0.01, P¼ 0.916, 2% proportional facilitation; Fig. 2c,d).
Thus, despite having the same intention to avoid retrieving
No-Think items, the substitution group showed no shadow.
Although retrieval suppression may trigger memory lapses,
perhaps any suitably difﬁcult task would also make people
forgetful. Perhaps suppression simply distracts participants,
despite our including buffer tasks intended to absorb the effects
of such distraction. If so, replacing retrieval suppression with an
exceptionally difﬁcult retrieval task also should induce memory
lapses, even when such a task should not reduce hippocampal
activity. We tested this idea in experiment 4, in which we replaced
No-Think trials with an exceptionally difﬁcult ‘Think-Harder’
task. On ‘Think-Harder’ trials, participants had to retrieve two
studied associates for each cue while also viewing
a new word; moreover, they needed to assess the new word’s
relatedness to the retrieved associates, and, under certain
conditions, replace an associate with the new word on future
trials—in other words, a task requiring multiple retrievals, new
learning and memory updating (Fig. 2e). Despite a wide disparity
in perceived difﬁculty across Think and Think-Harder trials
(Fig. 2f, right), retention of bystander events did not vary
according to whether they were surrounded by easy or hard trials
(Fig. 2f, left; F1,32o0.01, P40.999), indicating that suppression-
speciﬁc processes cause forgetting, not task difﬁculty.
Although consistent with an amnesic shadow, our ﬁndings
could also reﬂect improved memory for bystanders in the zero-
dose condition caused by nearby retrievals17. To test this,
experiment 5 compared memory for bystanders surrounded by
suppressions or retrievals with memory in a baseline group. In
this group, we replaced Think and No-Think cues with trial-
unique nonsense words that participants rehearsed in a forward
(green trials) or backward (red trials) direction—tasks selected
because they do not engage episodic retrieval. Otherwise, we
matched the hippocampal modulation and baseline procedures,
including word-pair training, red and green prompts, timing and
trial structure (Methods section, Supplementary Methods). The
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baseline task thus measured bystander memory uncontaminated
by processes that modulate hippocampal activity. Because
surrounding bystanders by forward or backward rehearsal did
not affect recall (Fo1), we averaged across these conditions,
yielding one baseline. Compared with this baseline, surrounding
bystanders with retrievals tended to improve recall, though
not reliably (F1,39¼ 2.00, P¼ 0.166); surrounding them with
suppressions, however, reliably harmed memory (Fig. 3a;
F1,39¼ 5.29, P¼ 0.027), yielding a robust overall shadow (zero-
versus two-dose conditions, F1,20¼ 13.71, P¼ 0.001, a 44%
proportional reduction). These ﬁndings indicate that the
shadow owes, in signiﬁcant part, to impairment prompted by
suppression.
Growth with repeated suppression. If the amnesic shadow tracks
hippocampal modulation, memory lapses may increase with
repeated suppression11. Evidence indicates that hippocampal
downregulation grows with practice at suppressing retrieval6.
This growth may be part of a qualitative shift in the fronto-
posterior networks supporting control, perhaps reﬂecting the
tuning of suppression in response to memory intrusions6,7.
Consistent with this, forgetting grew across quartiles of the
hippocampal modulation task in experiment 1 (Fig. 3b). Indeed,
across all immediate recall studies involving direct suppression,
practice increased amnesia: The ﬁrst half of the task showed no
shadow (F1,60¼ 1.87, P¼ 0.177), whereas the second half did
(F1,60¼ 24.90, Po0.001; interaction across halves, F1,60¼ 26.23,
Po0.001), and amnesia linearly increased across quartiles
(Fig. 3c, F1,60¼ 29.27, Po0.001). This linear decline largely
remained after 24 h (experiment 2, F1,20¼ 3.65, P¼ 0.071).
In contrast, in our control experiments (thought substitution,
Think/Think-Harder and phonological baseline conditions),
amnesia showed no such linear development (Fig. 3c;
F1,71¼ 1.38, P¼ 0.244), and the build-up was greater for direct
suppression than for control studies (interaction of linear trends,
F1,147¼ 7.99, P¼ 0.005).
Selective deﬁcits for episodic context. If hippocampal suppres-
sion triggers an amnesic shadow, recognizing bystander stimuli
also should suffer, particularly when it depends on hippocampal
representations. In many dual-process recognition models, the
hippocampus helps form traces that enable people to consciously
and vividly remember the particulars of an event12,18,19,
whereas this structure may be relatively less involved in simply
recognizing that the item had been encountered previously.
People may therefore forget bystanders when recognition requires
details of episodic context, more than basic item recognition.
Experiment 6 evaluated this using a test that attempted to
ascertain the relative contributions of context and item
recognition20. We replaced bystander scenes with words or
photographs of single items. Participants processed these items by
judging whether each was animate or inanimate (animacy task),
or instead whether it was pleasant or unpleasant (pleasantness
task). On the recognition test, we measured two things for each
bystander: people ﬁrst rated whether they had viewed the item
before (item recognition); they then decided which judgment they
made about it (context memory; Supplementary Methods).
Remarkably, whereas participants could recognize the items
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Figure 2 | Amnesic shadow in cued recall. (a) Immediate cued-recall accuracy for bystanders by number of adjacent suppression epochs. Difference
between the left- (peach colour) and right-most (dark orange) bars reveals an amnesic shadow (F-test). (b) Shadow observed after 24 h delay.
(c) Experiment 3’s two No-Think strategies. (d) Direct suppression, not thought substitution, caused a shadow. (e) Experiment 4 replaced No-Think trials
with a difﬁcult ‘Think-Harder’ task. (f) No shadow was observed in experiment 4 (left subpanel), despite a signiﬁcant difﬁculty disparity across types of
surrounding retrieval epochs (right subpanel, paired t-test). Error bars reﬂect within-participant s.e.m. *Po0.05; ***Po0.001.
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without difﬁculty (F1,152o0.01, P¼ 0.984, no shadow), they
exhibited a robust shadow in context memory (F1,152¼ 18.58,
Po0.001; interaction of shadow with measure, F1.89,286.58¼ 10.82,
Po0.001; Fig. 4a,b displays results separately for words and
pictures). As in prior experiments, the context deﬁcit grew
linearly over quartiles (F1,152¼ 6.65, P¼ 0.011, Supplementary
Fig. 3), unlike item memory (F1,152¼ 0.143, P¼ 0.706). The
complete lack of a shadow for item memory is surprising, given
that hippocampal lesions can impair item memory, though
to a much lesser degree than context memory21,22. Nevertheless,
the greater amnesic deﬁcit in context memory is compatible
with those dual-process models that ascribe the recognition of
strong, context-rich memories disproportionally to the hippo-
campus16,19.
Anterograde and retrograde components. Hippocampal amne-
sia patients experience profound memory loss1 for events
occurring after their lesion (anterograde amnesia) and events
occurring shortly before it (retrograde amnesia). To determine
whether suppression induced parallel effects, we compared
memory for bystanders that followed (anterograde) or preceded
(retrograde) a single suppression dose to items not abutted by
suppression (zero-dose condition). Across experiments, both
effects occurred for immediate recall (anterograde, F1,60¼ 23.68,
Po0.001; retrograde, F1,60¼ 8.06, P¼ 0.006) and context
recognition (retrograde, F1,152¼ 10.08, P¼ 0.002), though the
anterograde effect did not reach signiﬁcance on the latter measure
(F1,152¼ 2.10, P¼ 0.150). Neither of these effects varied reliably
across immediate and delayed tests (Fso1), and indications of
both effects occurred relative to baseline (Supplementary Data).
Together, these components contribute to the dose-response
effects observed across studies (0 versus 1 suppression dose in
recall, F1,60¼ 18.06, Po0.001; in recognition, F1,152¼ 7.40,
P¼ 0.007; 1 versus 2 doses in recall, F1,60¼ 4.59, P¼ 0.036; in
recognition, F1,152¼ 6.29, P¼ 0.013). The retrograde effect
further highlights that memory lapses are unlikely due to
inattention to bystanders, given that suppression’s effect also
occurred after bystander presentation. Rather, bystanders likely
suffer from disrupted hippocampal function that interrupts
stabilization23.
Relation to hippocampal modulation. Experiment 7 conﬁrmed
the presumed relation of the amnesic shadow to suppression-
induced hippocampal modulation using functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI). Adapting the recognition methods of
experiment 6 (Methods section, Supplementary Methods), we
observed a context recognition shadow under similar conditions
in Experiment 7 (Fig. 4c, see Supplementary Methods and
Supplementary Data for details). Prior work led us to expect this
amnesic shadow would be related to hippocampal modulation
driven by right lateral prefrontal cortex6,8–11,24. In line with this,
retrieval suppression during No-Think trials engaged a cluster of
right-lateralized cognitive control regions including the right
middle and inferior frontal gyri (Fig. 4, yellow cluster in brain
map) and also reduced overall hippocampal activity, primarily
on the left (Fig. 4d inset: our a priori bilateral anatomical
hippocampal region of interest (ROI), t(17)¼  1.88, P¼ 0.078).
Right prefrontal activations also correlated with reductions in
hippocampal activity (correlation with bilateral anatomical
hippocampus, Pearson skipped r¼ 0.60), echoing prior ﬁndings
establishing right-lateralized top–down control of hippocampal
activity8–10. Critically, hippocampal reductions during the TNT
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no such growth with practice (purple line). Error bars reﬂect s.e.m. *Po0.05; **Po0.01.
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task positively predicted the extent of context amnesia for
bystander stimuli (robust correlation with bilateral anatomical
ROI, r¼ 0.55), conﬁrming the hypothesized link between
hippocampal modulation and the amnesic shadow.
Discussion
Together, our ﬁndings reveal that temporary suppression of
hippocampal activity induced through cognitive control creates
windows of amnesia in healthy people. Suppressing retrieval
triggered enduring memory loss for unrelated ‘bystander’ events,
which showed up to a 45% proportional memory deﬁcit.
Strikingly, people forgot events they had fully attended to and
processed deeply, and that were unrelated to the memories they
suppressed. The amnesic shadow showed a dose-response
function, occurred in both temporal directions, and increased
with practice at stopping retrieval in both recall and context
recognition—but not item recognition; and the shadow was not
produced by distraction from other types of difﬁcult tasks.
Interestingly, controlling awareness of an unwanted memory
through thought substitution rather than suppression produced
no shadow. We predicted these characteristics from established
properties of the hippocampus and conﬁrmed a link to
hippocampal modulation with fMRI.
The factors governing whether and how memories are
disturbed need clariﬁcation. Whether memories are disturbed
may depend on how close in time their encoding is to suppression
episodes, perhaps showing a temporal gradient (though even
older memories may suffer if reactivated recently)25. How
memories are disturbed may depend on suppression-speciﬁc
processes; alternatively, other tasks that reduce hippocampal
activity may also disturb memory formation. Research on the
default mode network, for example, reveals that performing
focused tasks reduces hippocampal activity relative to the default
state with no task26, and such reductions may impair memory. It
is noteworthy, however, that we did not observe amnesia
from other complex tasks that did not require suppression
(for example, memory retrieval, updating and phonological
rehearsal—buffered by odd/even judgments), suggesting that
memory disruption is speciﬁc to retrieval suppression processes
and not to blood–oxygen-level dependent reductions more
broadly. Exploring such possibilities in conjunction with
neuroimaging designs adapted to track bystander-related
activity during and after their presentation would complement
the present focus on behavioural sequelae of suppression-related
modulations. Regardless of whether the amnesic shadow is
unique to suppression, what is clear is that suppressing
hippocampal activity through cognitive control induces a state
akin to a virtual lesion, mimicking hippocampal amnesia.
Cognitively induced amnesia carries mechanistic implications
for retrieval suppression and cognitive control more broadly.
Retrieval suppression is known to harm retention of the
suppressed memories, but prior behavioural and neuroimaging
work did not address whether inhibitory control mechanisms
Exp. 6a Word
recognition (N=72)
Exp. 6b Picture
recognition (N=112)
Exp. 7 Word
recognition (N=18)
1.00
0.90
0.80
0.70
0.40
0 L R B
O
ve
ra
ll
m
o
du
la
tio
n
(a.
u.)0.30
0.20
0.10
0.00
–0.10
0 0
1.00
0.90
0.80
0.70
1.00
0.90
0.80
0.70
Context memory
Bilateral hippocampal modulation
(Think – No-Think, a.u.)
Bilateral hippocampal modulation
(Think – No-Think, a.u.)
Ana
tom
ical
hipp
oca
mpu
s
Frontalcontrol cluster
Exp. 7 Neuroimaging Frontal engagement predicts
hippocampal modulation
Hippocampal modulation
predicts forgetting
Item memory Context memory
Number of suppression epochs
0 Epochs 1 Epoch 2 Epochs
Context memoryItem memory
**
*
r = 0.55‡
+
r = 0.60‡
+
**
By
st
an
de
r r
ec
og
ni
tio
n
Am
ne
si
c 
sh
ad
ow
 e
ffe
ct
(0–
2 e
po
ch
s)
Fr
o
n
ta
l e
ng
ag
em
en
t
(N
o–
Th
ink
 –T
hin
k, 
a.u
.)
By
st
an
de
r r
ec
og
ni
tio
n
By
st
an
de
r r
ec
og
ni
tio
n
a
d e
cb
Figure 4 | Amnesic shadow in recognition. (a) Memory for context, not items, is impaired for words (F-test). (b) Replication with pictures. (c) Context
amnesia in experiment 7. (d) Right-most inset bar illustrates mean (error bar, s.e.m.) bilateral hippocampal modulation (blue anatomical region of interest
seen in adjoining glass brain) during suppression, relative to retrieval in arbitrary units (a.u.). Modulation (two-tailed t-tests) in left and right hippocampi
also is plotted separately for exploratory purposes (with Bonferroni correction for multiple corrections across the two hemispheres). Across participants,
modulation predicted context amnesia (outlier-skipped Pearson bootstrap 95% conﬁdence interval (CI): (0.13, 0.79)). Q (e) Suppression-related frontal
engagement (yellow No-Think4Think functional mask) predicted hippocampal modulation (bootstrap CI: (0.03, 0.87)). Robust correlation removed
bivariate outliers from relevant analysis/plot. Error bars for behaviour (a–c) reﬂect within-participant s.e.m.; red bands, 95% CI; zsigniﬁcant correlation by
bootstrap test; *Po0.05; **Po0.01; þ Pr0.10.
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targeted speciﬁc memory traces or hippocampal retrieval
processes more systemically. The present evidence, however,
permits clear inferences about functional breadth of the
suppression mechanism: only a broad, systemic suppression
mechanism predicts that suppressing retrieval would cause
forgetting of diverse stimuli (words, objects and scenes) that
were entirely unrelated to the suppressed content. Critically, this
systemic targeting not only interrupts pattern completion, but
also affects encoding and stabilization processes needed by other
memories. If so, this ﬁnding holds general lessons about cognitive
control. It implicates a class of inhibitory control mechanisms
differing from biased competition27—a class that relies instead on
direct systemic inhibitory modulation to suppress regional
processing28,29. Thus, systemic suppression may be not only a
key mechanism of memory control, but also a general principle of
inhibitory control that is relevant to many other domains, such as
affect regulation and motor stopping.
The present phenomenon reveals a force affecting memory for
life experiences that appears unexplained by current theories of
forgetting. Over the last century, forgetting has been attributed to
decay, interference30, contextual change between encoding and
retrieval31, inhibition32 and disrupted hippocampal consolidation
arising from the encoding of subsequent interfering
memories33,34. Memories lost to the amnesic shadow appear
not to be forgotten for these reasons; compared with control (zero
dose) items, they are equally old and subject to decay; they are
preceded and followed by the same bystanders, equating
interference; and they are not direct targets of inhibitory
control. Moreover, although we have argued for interrupted
memory stabilization, here disruption arises from suppression
and not merely from generic intervening mnemonic activity14,35.
Indeed, although ample precedent exists suggesting that the
mnemonic activity that intervenes between initial presentation
and ﬁnal test of bystanders should harm their retention
through inteference35, the total amount of this interfering
activity was matched across zero- and two-dose conditions in
all current studies. The additional forgetting arising from
adjacent suppression trials can, therefore, be isolated to the
disruptive effects of suppression, as indicated by experiments 3–5.
Suppression appears to disrupt processes following event
encoding that are necessary to stabilize memories, though it
remains unclear whether it only disrupts input to consolidation
mechanisms, or also the consolidation process itself. Regardless of
the particular process affected, our ﬁndings suggest that
hippocampal downregulation—whether achieved via retrieval
suppression or other task states—is a potent force unaddressed
by classical or modern theories of forgetting.
Identifying this forgetting mechanism is not merely of
theoretical concern. Evidence suggests that it may sometimes
underlie profound memory deﬁcits. After major traumas,
intrusive memories pervade experience, and people often cope
by trying to prevent their retrieval. If so, systemic suppression of
hippocampal activity may punctuate experience to such a degree
that amnesic shadows become debilitating. Indeed, memory
deﬁcits often accompany acute and post-traumatic stress disorders,
even for neutral memories unrelated to the trauma36–38.
Hippocampus-dependent tasks such as associative recognition are
impaired dramatically, with minor item recognition deﬁcits (as
observed here)38. Strikingly, memory problems in these
populations often dissipate as intrusions abate37. These deﬁcits
have received much attention36 with explanations focusing on
trauma-related factors such as distractibility39, poor sleep40
and stress-related neurochemicals that trigger hippocampal
dysfunction41. Our ﬁndings suggest another complementary
factor. They highlight an arrestingly simple dynamic that may
contribute to the cruel irony of being haunted by traumatic
memories while suffering impoverished retention of daily events:
Efforts to forget a troubling past may, ironically, leave amnesia for
the present in their wake.
Methods
Overview of basic methodology. A modiﬁed TNT protocol5,42 was used.
Participants initially learned cue-target word pairs to criterion (50% minimum in
experiments 2, 4 and 5; 100% in the remaining experiments). During the critical
TNT phase that followed, cues were presented in isolation, with the display colour
indicating whether the target should be silently retrieved (if green) or suppressed
(if red). Cues were repeated 12 times, except for the third reserved as baseline
items, which were not represented during the TNT phase.
Between Think and No-Think trials, participants occasionally encountered
novel ‘bystander’ stimuli that were unrelated to the word pairs, for which they
completed an orienting task. In experiments 1–5, the orienting task was to silently
generate an explanation for why the central object in the bystander photograph (for
example, peacock) appeared in the pictured background (for example, parking lot)
and then to rate the difﬁculty in generating that explanation on a four-point scale
by pressing a button (1¼ ‘no difﬁculty’ to 4¼ ‘extreme difﬁculty’). Experiments 6
and 7 asked participants to judge whether the (written or pictured) object
presented on that trial was animate or pleasant, depending on the visual instruction
prompt. Bounding every critical bystander—and in experiment 7, all trial
types—was a block of odd/even buffer judgments. During buffer periods,
participants decided whether each of a sequence of digits (experiments 1, 3 and 6)
or the sum of two digits (experiments 2, 4, 5 and 7) was even by pressing the
appropriate button as quickly and as accurately as possible. These buffers were
included to match the local task shifts into and out of the bystander presentations
across conditions.
Most experiments required participants to suppress associates of red cues
directly—that is, without recalling substitute thoughts or memories that might
engage hippocampus-dependent retrieval processes. Experiment 3 pitted these
strategies (direct suppression and thought substitution) against each other, and
strategy choice was left to participants’ discretion in elements of experiment 6. In
all cases, they were to fully attend to and ﬁxate on the presented TNT cues.
Participants’ understanding of and adherence to task instructions, including those
related to direct suppression, were assessed via diagnostic questionnaires
administered throughout the practice sessions before the TNT phase and also
halfway through the TNT session. After the experiment, participants also rated
their compliance with the No-Think instructions.
In between the TNT phase and the post-experiment questionnaire,
participants’ memory for bystander items was tested, as detailed in the
body of the report. The object-recall test in experiments 1–5 had a timeout of
15 s. The two-step recognition test in experiment 6 ﬁrst presented a six-point
conﬁdence scale for old/new item recognition before a context memory
judgment about whether the bystander was originally presented as part of the
animacy or pleasantness task (Supplementary Fig. 1). Experiment 7 only
tested context memory. Before the post-experiment questionnaire, participants’
memory for TNT associates was tested (Supplementary Methods and
Supplementary Data).
General description of participants. The number of participants per experiment
varied, primarily due to counterbalancing constraints. Participants were also
excluded if they did not meet eligibility requirements or evidenced a persistent and
purposeful failure to comply with suppression instructions43, as assessed by a
post-experiment questionnaire (see Supplementary Table 1 for exclusions and
further details). The ﬁnal sample, across experiments, involved 381 unique
participants ranging in age from 18 to 35 years, 245 of whom were female.
Participants were recruited from three sites (the University of Oregon
(Eugene, Oregon, USA), the University of St. Andrews (St. Andrews, Scotland), and
the Medical Research Council’s Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit (MRC–CBU,
Cambridge, England)) purportedly to partake in an experiment designed to assess
their ability to pay attention and ignore distracting things. Experiment protocols
were approved by the relevant ethics committee (Oregon: Institutional Review
Board protocol #C1-314-07F; St Andrews: University Teaching and Research
Ethics Committee reference number PS5008; MRC–CBU: Cambridge Psychology
Research Ethics Committee reference number 2009.60). Written informed consent
was obtained from all participants. See also Supplementary Table 1.
Eligible participants were neurologically healthy without diagnosed learning/
reading/attention disorders, had normal/normal-corrected colour vision, and were
exposed to English as a primary language since early childhood (0–3 years).
Additional constraints were instituted according to the operational standards at the
MRC–CBU for the fMRI experiment. Participants were to be right-handed and not
have metal in their bodies, be claustrophobic, or be on psychoactive medications.
Participants were asked to sleep a minimum of 6 h the night before their session(s).
Participants were to have had no previous experience with the TNT protocol.
Remuneration came in the form of payment or—in the cases of the Universities of
Oregon and St. Andrews—credit towards fulﬁlling a requirement for an
introductory psychology course.
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General materials. There were 36 critical TNT word pairs and a variable number
of ﬁllers. The nature of the stimuli and many of the pairs themselves followed
previous work5. Although the stimuli were constructed under the same
stipulations, experiment 7 only called for 30 critical TNT pairs (10/condition).
The constituent members of each pair (for example, ‘LEAP-BALLET’) were
designed to be associable but not so associated as to encourage a reliance on
guessing. Word-association norms helped guide and validate stimulus selection44.
Care was taken to avoid pre-existing semantic relationships between items from
different TNT pairs, with the bystanders and with TNT test cues. TNT associates
(for example, ‘BALLET’) were selected such that each was an exemplar of a
unique superordinate category (for example, ‘DANCE’), with which recall could
be cued on the independent-probe test, taking the form of ‘DANCE-B___.’ This
constraint was relaxed in experiment 4 because no independent-probe test was
administered. This test assesses the accessibility of a target memory itself,
independent of the strength of the original cue-target association32,42, whereas
the same-probe test cues recall with the learned cue (e.g., ‘LEAP’).
Critical TNT word pairs were randomly divided into three subsets and
counterbalanced across participants, as a rule. One-third of the cues would appear
in a green rectangle during the TNT phase (Think cues). Another third would
appear in a red rectangle (No-Think cues). The remaining third of the items
(Baseline) did not reappear during the TNT phase. Participants at Oregon in
experiment 6 followed a similar protocol; however, the cue words were presented in
a diagnostic red/green font, without a surrounding rectangle.
Participants in most experiments were provided with brief precues and postcues
surrounding every Think and No-Think trial (Supplementary Fig. 1). The precues
were designed to facilitate preparation of the relevant task set45. Displays during
these periods consisted of a lone rectangle—the same size and colour in which the
TNT cue was presented. As such, participants ﬁrst saw a coloured rectangle for
750ms, onto which a TNT cue was superimposed for 2500ms before it
disappeared, leaving a blank, coloured rectangle for an additional 250ms
(see Supplementary Methods and Supplementary Table 1 for timing variations).
Critical bystanders in experiments 1–5 consisted of 32 digital photographs
(and 27 ﬁllers) of real-world backgrounds with and without a distinctive, nameable
central object present. Each posed still was captured from the same vantage point
twice: once with a nameable central object and once with the central object missing.
The background settings and objects were chosen to be relatively distinct. For the
word recognition variant of experiment 6, a set of 64 critical nouns (half to serve as
targets and half as lures in the subsequent item recognition test) was drawn from
the MRC’s psycholinguistic database46, with preference for words from an earlier
neuroimaging study of item and context memory20. Roughly half of the critical
items represented something living, with the remainder being non-living according
to norms and the experimenters. For the picture recognition variant of experiment
6, the bystander words described above were substituted with the same number of
full-colour photographs (often pictorial representations of the same nouns against
a white background). These stimuli were selected to limit semantic clustering.
Experiment 7’s stimulus set was based on the word version of experiment 6, but it
was expanded to include 78 critical target nouns. As we did not test item memory
in experiment 7, no lures were held in reserve.
A visual warning preceded bystander trials. In experiments 1–5, the prompt
‘object/setting’ appeared centrally for 500ms and was then immediately replaced by
the photo and rating scale. Experiments 6 and 7 similarly incorporated the prompts
‘living?’ and ‘pleasant?’ Before the ﬁrst odd/even judgment in a series, participants
received a warning in the form of the prompt ‘even?’ for 500ms across all
experiments, with the exception of those participating in Oregon for experiment 6,
who received a central ﬁxation cross instead lasting 300ms.
The four possible permutations of Think and No-Think trials surrounding
bystanders were uniformly distributed across the entire TNT phase, as well as
within each of the eight (or six, in the case of experiment 7) constituent blocks.
At a minimum, the ﬁrst and last four TNT trials—as well as the ﬁrst and last
bystanders—in each block were ﬁllers so as to control for primacy and recency
effects; however, for imaging purposes, experiment 7 did not present any ﬁller
items (TNT or bystanders) during the critical TNT phase. Otherwise, block
randomization was used to create the presentation schedules, with ﬁller items
distributed to minimize the predictability of the upcoming trial type. Manual
alterations to the randomization were occasionally introduced to ensure
all of the relevant bystander-TNT permutations of interest occurred in
each block.
The assignment of bystanders to these four permutations (that is, the TNT
frame, which could consist of no suppression either before or after the bystander, a
single suppression epoch before the bystander, a single suppression epoch after the
bystander or a suppression epoch both before and after the bystander) was
counterbalanced across participants, except in experiment 7, for which item
assignment was automatically randomized for each participant. The type of
judgment performed on the bystander (that is, living or pleasantness judgment)
was similarly randomized for each item in experiment 7.
In experiments 1, 3 and 6, a pre-determined series of two to four odd/even
buffer judgments was presented around critical bystanders during the TNT phase.
After a response or a timeout (at 900ms), the next trial was presented. In the other
experiments, participants had a ﬁxed period of time (6500ms in experiments 2, 4
and 5; a jittered duration in experiment 7) to complete as many semi-self-paced
odd/even judgments as possible on the sums of successively presented pairs of
digits. Participants were instructed to make these judgments as quickly and as
accurately as possible.
General analysis approach. The Greenhouse–Geisser correction was applied when
a potential violation of the sphericity assumption was detected by Mauchly’s test. An
alpha level of 0.05 was used throughout, and estimated marginal means are provided
for descriptive purposes. Also for the purposes of visualization, plots intended to
compare within-participant variance incorporate error bars derived from a method
that ﬁrst standardizes the data across participants47. Difference scores and between-
participant effects are plotted with error bars reﬂecting traditional s.e.m.
In computing accuracy scores across measures of interest, non-responses, while
rare, were coded as incorrect. Reaction time statistics were computed on the basis
of correct trials only, when accuracy was determinable. Although the raw reaction
times are reported for display purposes, statistical analyses were performed on the
base-10 log-transformed data to normalize the positive skew that often arises with
zero-gated reaction time measures. Transforming the data in this way did not
meaningfully change the conclusions drawn from parallel analyses on the raw data.
We largely focused our analyses on bystander events (and surrounding
odd/even judgments) presented in the second half of the TNT phase, after
participants had received ample practice at retrieval suppression. This focus was
based on prior published work reporting suppression-related hippocampal
deﬂections from pretrial baseline activity only after sufﬁcient suppression practise6.
To improve statistical power in the experiment 7, we had participants practise
retrieving/suppressing the TNT word pairs before introducing any critical
bystanders. As such, we analysed bystander recall irrespective of their placement in
the TNT phase (follow-up analyses supported the assumption that there were no
differences across halves).
Bystander cued recall. Cued-recall responses for bystander objects were coded for
accuracy and entered into a mixed-design analysis of variance, with the number of
surrounding suppression epochs (0, 1 or 2) entered as a repeated measures factor,
along with the half into which the bystander item was introduced during the TNT
phase. Coding was done blind to condition. A similar analysis approach was taken
for the other bystander/online measures. Item counterbalancing was included as a
between-participant factor. Planned contrasts allowed for tests of the amnesic
shadow effect, deﬁned as the difference in cued-recall accuracy between the zero-
and two-epoch conditions, for bystanders presented in the second half of the
relevant behavioural experiment.
Bystander item recognition. Responses along the six-point conﬁdence scale for
item recognition, which ranged from ‘1’ (deﬁnitely new) to ‘6’ (deﬁnitely old), were
divided into two bins representing items the participant judged as ‘new’ (1–3
responses) or ‘old’ (4–6 responses). Accuracy was computed by comparing the
reported status (old or new) to veridical status (target or foil). As participants were
informed that they should focus on accuracy and not be rushed, accuracy—rather
than reaction time—served as the dependent measure.
Bystander context recognition. Participants were again encouraged to respond as
carefully and accurately as possible, having been provided ample time to do so. As
above, accuracy was the dependent measure.
Online measures of attention. Accuracy and reaction time on the odd/even buffer
tasks were analysed based on whether the relevant decisions followed a Think or a
No-Think trial. Participants’ subjective ratings (on the four-point difﬁculty scale) to
the bystander orienting task in experiments 1–5 were analysed on the basis of
number of surrounding suppression epochs. Reaction times were analysed in a
similar manner, though participants were not pressured to respond quickly, so long
as they responded within the allotted 5 s. Responses to the living and pleasantness
judgments in experiment 6 and 7 were registered using ‘yes’ and ‘no’ buttons.
Participants were instructed to use intuition and not linger over their decision,
should the cue be considered ambiguous with respect to the orienting task. Results
for each behavioural experiment are presented in Supplementary Table 2.
TNT ﬁnal test data. To reduce noise in the ﬁnal test measures owing to differences
in learning, accuracy was computed conditionalized on successful recall of a
given item during the ﬁnal round of testing during the initial learning phase.
Conditionalized accuracy on the TNT ﬁnal tests was entered into a mixed-design
analysis of variance, with condition (Think, No-Think, and Baseline) entered as a
within-participant factor and item counterbalancing as a between-participant factor.
Planned contrasts isolated the negative- and positive-control effects, measured as
differences from Baseline recall for No-Think and Think conditions, respectively.
Data availability. Imaging data (MR10010) are stored on the MRC–CBU archive
and are available on request.
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